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Abstract
Numerous attempts to create a regional human rights system in Asia have proven unsuccess-
ful, and human rights are still intended as an ideal principle. Nevertheless, the last two decades 
witnessed a proliferation of “human rights talk” at both the regional and national levels.
This article offers an interpretation about past and current offi cial human rights talks at the 
regional level in Asia and considers the reasons for privileging a specifi c conception of human 
rights over other competing visions. In addition, it assesses the impact that the human rights vi-
sions articulated in Asian talks have upon the creation of a regional human rights system. This 
article gives particular attention to the offi cial talks on human rights at the regional level, con-
sidering how the relationship between rights and culture is conceptualized.
On the whole, the article demonstrates how the utilization of culture as a concept in talks 
about rights in the last thirty years has changed only partially, indicating different but equally 
opportunistic approaches to the concept of human rights.
1. Introduction
Human rights regionalism is a relevant reality in the overall architecture of the international 
protection of human rights. Since the concept’s fi rst appearance in Chapter VIII of the UN Char-
ter, 1 human rights regionalism has become more than a mere concession for the maintenance of 
peace or a theoretical possibility for the pacifi c settlement of disputes. According to the propo-
nents of regionalism in the contemporary legal arena, “United Nations and regional institutions 
need one another and should continue to work closely in addressing regional issues as well as 
international issues.” 2 Only a meaningful division of labor between global, regional and domestic 
systems could produce a valuable response to human rights violations. Indeed, in virtue of their 
fl exibility, regional systems may combine an immediate response to specifi c problems with long-
term strategies. 3
In the overall architecture of the international human rights law, regional institutions are 
structurally in an intermediate position. This intermediate institutional level has never been in-
tended to be a substitute for either the international structure or the domestic one; rather, this sys-
tem has been devised to complement and supplement the structure in place. It is indeed subsid-
iary to domestic instruments whenever national governments have violated human rights or their 
remedies have failed. 4 Moreover, it is complementary to the UN system; the latter lacks the inter-
nal co-ordination and effi cacious instruments for investigating and redressing human rights vio-
lations at the national level. Proponents of human rights regionalism assert that in virtue of their 
intermediate position, regional systems are able to include both the core setting of basic rights as 
well as many regional and domestic particularities, thus enhancing a non-absolutist conception of 
universality.
In contrast to the other world regions, Asia does not have a regional human rights system 
based upon regional human rights documents and institutions such as courts or commissions. 5 
In the last fi fty years, numerous attempts have been made to create regional or sub-regional hu-
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man rights mechanisms in Asia. Since the 1960s, UN-sponsored seminars in the Asia-Pacific 
have been following one another, bringing together government representatives, regional NGOs, 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) and UN agencies to explore possibilities of devel-
oping regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights. 6 Historical and 
more recent attempts include a number of seminars, conferences, and fi fteen regional workshops 
organized by the UN Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) South Asia 
Offi ce, 7 which have discussed regional technical cooperation for the establishment of regional 
and sub-regional human rights mechanisms. Four priority pillars of cooperation have been estab-
lished – national human rights action plans (NHRAP), 8 human rights education, NHRI9 and the 
right to development and economic, social and cultural rights 10 – and states have sought to gradu-
ally undertake related activities. 11 Domestic actions are reviewed periodically during regional 
workshops.
The initiatives undertaken preliminarily addressed the need for regional arrangements, but 
the overall lack of any meaningful developments limited thier signifi cance. Even the 2007 ASE-
AN Charter, designed “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law 
and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” provides a very hesitant 
approach to human rights. George Yeo, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, provided an assessment of 
the Charter by saying, “I’m not sure whether it will have teeth but it will have a tongue. It will 
certainly have moral influence, if nothing else.” 12 Similarly, the Singaporean Second Foreign 
Minister, Raymond Lim, argued that the ASEAN Human Rights Commission, as defi ned in the 
Charter, “will likely be consultative rather than prescriptive.” 13
To this day, the quest for a regional mechanism has not died down and still represents an 
ongoing appeal for many human rights practitioners around Asia. These practitioners look at this 
goal as the only concrete option to provide justice where national institutions are unable or un-
willing to offer it. 14
This article offers an interpretation about past and current human rights talks at the regional 
level in Asia and considers the reasons for privileging a specific conception of human rights 
over other competing visions. Additionally, it assesses the impact that the human rights visions 
articulated in Asian talks have upon the creation of a regional human rights system. Moreover, 
the article gives particular attention to the official talks on human rights at the regional level, 
considering how the relationship between rights and culture is conceptualized. On the whole, it 
demonstrates how the concept of culture, as it has been utilized in talks about rights in the last 
thirty years, has changed only partially, indicating different but equally opportunistic approaches 
to conceptualizing human rights.
Human rights represent important catalysts in the overall process of regional integration, as 
they signifi cantly promote social and institutional integration by codifying social behavior and 
deepening the sense of regional community and solidarity. Indeed, the relationship between cul-
ture and rights is an important one and deserves an accurate analysis in the context of regional 
integration in Asia. The fi rst story told by this article regarding the relationship between human 
rights and culture in Asia is that of opposition; the two concepts live here in a closed and static 
image of culture that hampers the creation of a human rights system. Thus, this narrative para-
doxically presents Asian culture as outwardly unifi ed, but internally so diverse as to obstruct so-
cial integration at the regional level. The second story talks about changes in understanding about 
culture – now intended as an open and dynamic concept – which has developed from the process 
of globalization; further, it explains the effects of an emerging “human rights culture” which may 
lead to gradual socio-cultural integration in the region.
The paper is organized in three main sections. The fi rst section offers a brief overview of the 
contested relationship between human rights and culture, as it has been conceptualized by anthro-
pologists in the last decades. The second part assesses the way human rights have been discussed 
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in Asia, particularly in the context of the ASEAN group of nations. Particular attention is given 
to the relationship between human rights and culture and the way it has evolved in the last twenty 
years. The third and concluding part of the article considers the impact of ASEAN approaches to 
human rights and culture on the realization of human rights regionalism.
On the whole, the article represents a signifi cant contribution to the literature on regional 
integration, as it discusses one highly contentious area in the general discourse on regionalism 
and integration. Differently from the existing literature on human rights and regionalism, which 
mainly considers legal, political or international relations perspectives, this article provides an 
interpretive approach to discourses about human rights and culture in Asia that may shed light on 
the inherent dynamics of social and institutional integration.
2. Human Rights and Culture: A Contested Relationship
Neither rights nor culture are easily defi nable concepts and, over time, views and defi nitions 
have transformed, sometimes complementing each other, sometimes confl icting or overlapping. 
Approaches toward rights are often the result of historically grounded cultural conceptions.
The instrumental use of both the concepts for political purposes has indeed generated con-
fusion about defi nitions, as well as skepticism about the substantive value of human rights. Ac-
cording to Twining, in order to provide a fair definition of rights, it is important “to maintain 
broad distinctions between human rights talk as forms of political rhetoric, of legal expositions 
and argument, and as moral discourses.” 15 Thus, in General Jurisprudence, Twining offers a criti-
cal overview of the main conceptions of human rights that have developed in the last fi fty years, 
framed within specifi c historical backgrounds, and he unravels fi ve major conceptualizations of 
the term “human rights.” These are: human rights as a legal regime, as substantive moral theo-
ries, as discourses, as political ideas and practice and as Western colonial and neo-colonial ideol-
ogy. 16
The relationship between human rights and culture has often been an area of contention. 
During the 1990s, an essentialized understanding of culture shaped the universalism-relativism 
debate, which opposed global standards of social justice and respect for global practices. While 
supporters of universalism argued that human rights principles should apply indiscriminately to 
all cultures, relativists asserted the importance of cultural differences over universal standards. 17
Underlying the universalism-cultural relativism debate was the substantive moral under-
standing of human rights as a set of universal moral principles applicable to all people at all 
times, and everywhere, irrespective of beliefs and cultures. Such a view – grounded in European 
religious and philosophical thinking dating back to the Greeks and the Romans – was based on 
the belief of a universal human ontology and the idea that human rights were embedded in origi-
nal values shared by all human beings because of their common nature.
To oppose the argument on the universality of human rights values, relativists used a broadly 
defi ned concept of culture indicating a coherent, uniform and timeless whole in the meaning sys-
tems of a given group. In order to mark a distinction between universal and local values, culture 
became a reifi ed, 18 essentialized and homogenous entity, drawing defi nite boundaries between the 
“Us” and the “Others.” 19
Both the instrumental use of the rhetoric of culture to legitimize claims of power and the 
strengthening of the process of globalization led theorists to question the universalism-relativism 
debate. Indeed, although it was still acceptable during the 1990s to use earlier European an-
thropological conceptions that maintain that culture is integrated, harmonious, consensual and 
bounded, in the new century, these views are considered largely obsolete.
New conceptions of culture have emerged and the concept has started to take the form of a 
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hybrid and porous entity that may promote change and develop. 20 As argued by Merry:
In the last two decades, world system theory has criticized the model of society as an iso-
lated ‘billiard ball’ within global economic and cultural processes (Wolf 1982)…Culture 
is now understood as historically produced rather than static; unbounded rather than 
bounded and integrated; contested rather than consensual; incorporated within struc-
tures of power such as the construction of hegemony; rooted in practices and symbols, 
habits, patterns …and negotiated and constructed through human action rather than su-
perorganic forces. 21
With the new century, the “rights versus culture perspective” has shifted toward a “human rights 
culture perspective” in which human rights have progressively become part of the cultural dis-
courses at various levels – transnationally, nationally and locally. Thus, beside a legalist approach 
toward rights, two other main perspectives prevail; that is, human rights as globally circulating 
discourses, and human rights as local experiences of communities in struggle.
Amartya Sen, for example, argues that the survivability of human rights does not depend 
upon grounded moral theories, but upon rights’ claims in open discussions both within and across 
societies. 22 Accordingly, “‘rights talk’ is a form of discourse with varied and changing content, 
which provides a framework for argument, negotiation, interpretation and articulating or making 
claims.” 23 Others, like Baxi and Rajaghopal, have developed “subaltern perspectives” of human 
rights, according to which human rights are not based on moral or legal principles but emerge di-
rectly from local struggles against poverty and injustice.
Anthropologists like Merry have also started to look at different cultural sites where inter-
national or regional elites conceptualized and translated rights into international legal standards. 
UN meetings have become the subject of study, being “shaped by a culture of transnational mo-
dernity, one that specifi es procedures for collaborative decision-making, conceptions of global 
social justice…Its [human rights laws] documents create new cultural frameworks for conceptu-
alizing social justice.” 24
3. The Asian Approaches to Human Rights and Culture
The fact that Asia is lacking a regional human rights system made of commissions, courts 
and foundational legal standards does not mean that the concept of human rights has not infl u-
enced regional practices and discourses, or that the region is completely silent in this respect. In 
Asia, as in other parts of the world, different perspectives about culture and rights have been in-
forming both individual and collective discourses.
This section of the article looks at the approach toward human rights and culture adopted 
by Asian decision-makers in the last three decades and assesses its impact upon the tentative cre-
ation of an Asian regional human rights system.
(1) Culture Versus Rights
During the 1990s, Asian leaders rejected human rights by claiming to be defending culture. 
The Asian debate over human rights set “Asian values” against universal human rights, assert-
ing Asia’s cultural uniqueness and the inappropriateness of human rights in the regional context. 
The “Asian values” argument that emerged after the 1993 Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights 
denied the universal applicability of human rights, rejected civil and political rights as being 
specifi cally Western and culturally inadequate for the Asian communitarian context, and stressed 
the primacy of economic development over civil and political rights. The Declaration asserts that 
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“while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic 
and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the signifi cance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.” 25
Mainly promoted by elites from Singapore and Malaysia, 26 the “Asian values” discourse as-
serted that Western liberal democratic values are inapplicable in the Asian context; the discussion 
characterized such values as a Western imposition confl icting with the indigenous values of Asia, 
detrimental to Asian economic development. Assuming a unifying cultural mantle for Asia, the 
“Asian values” proponents argued for the idea of Asian cultural uniqueness based on Confucian 
and communitarian roots. However, the fact that the highly westernized elites of Singapore and 
Indonesia welcomed industrialization and its consequences made the rejection of human rights in 
the name of “Asian values” highly suspicious. 27
The 1997 “ASEAN-Vision 2020” – a clear expression of its times – did not make any refer-
ence to human rights, but mentioned the importance of social justice and the rule of law. In the 
document, ASEAN leaders envisioned “the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN 
community conscious of its ties with history, aware of its cultural heritage, and bound by a com-
mon regional identity.” 28
Various Asian and Western scholars have already discussed at length the fallacious approach 
taken in the “Asian values” debate. Thus, it is clear that the “Asian values” debate prompted 
some focused refl ection on the moral value of human rights and the concept of culture. The fact 
that human rights were perceived as a neo-colonial imposition by Western countries raised skep-
ticism toward the morality of the concept itself. As relativists, Asian leaders implicitly supported 
the view that “there can be no essential characteristics of human nature or human rights, which 
exist outside of discourse, history, context or agency,” 29 and that human rights are socially con-
structed concepts to impose political power, hegemony. 30
Without questioning whether human rights could be grounded only on Western concepts of 
natural law, individualism and liberalism, or if they could be adapted to local circumstances, the 
proponents of the “Asian values” debate rejected the concept of human rights tout court, raising 
local culture against any claims of universalism in human rights. The extreme cultural relativism 
proposed by the Asian leaders was based on a static and closed idea of culture, which implicitly 
served legitimacy and power purposes. This “essentialist view of culture” echoed Romantic na-
tionalism, an approach that conceived “diversity as a problem to be solved” 31 and impeded new 
and alien ideas from being absorbed or reshaped, making intercultural dialogue extremely diffi -
cult. The “Asian values” debate used culture as a rhetorical object. Those who recognized human 
rights were seen to deny and reject the Asian culture. Conversely, those who considered the value 
of culture as supreme were seen to override the pursuit of universal human rights.
The 1997-1998 Asian economic meltdown seriously affected Asian confi dence in economic 
development, and brought the public debate on “Asian values” to an end. Nevertheless, a number 
of scholars admit that the debate is still highly salient now, and continues to be important when 
considering human rights approaches in individual Asian countries. 32 Yet, “although the Asian 
values argument is less often articulated now, it represents one of many ways that leaders assert 
that human rights violate the fundamental cultural principles of a nation or a religion and there-
fore cannot be adopted.” 33
Even though the concept “Asian value” seems overly anachronistic now, it must still be ad-
mitted that it did carry weight enough to have stimulated sustained refl ections both in Asia and in 
Western countries about the signifi cance of culture when constructing a normative moral order; 
furthermore, it questioned the assumption that human rights truly represent “the best medium for 
cross-cultural discourse and dialogue” 34 within diverse systems of justice. The next section of the 
article shows whether, and in what ways, the relationship between culture and rights has been re-
shaped in current offi cial approaches to human rights in the ASEAN context.
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Because of the developments and the sustained discussions on human rights in ASEAN, 
this sub-region represents an interesting and comparatively simpler laboratory for elucidating the 
main characteristics of the relationship between human rights and culture in the whole Asian re-
gion. Indeed, the ASEAN case may be intended as illustrative of the challenges facing Asia more 
generally.
(2) Human Rights as a Cultural Process?
Since the late 1990s, human rights issues have been discussed in a more open and frank 
manner. 35 While roundtable discussions and meetings at the regional and sub-regional levels seem 
not to have been particularly effective in producing practical results, they have nonetheless been 
important for reiterating on a periodical basis the need to foster the creation of regional and sub-
regional human rights mechanisms; 36 in addition, on a broader scale, they have been useful for 
understanding the regional nuances of human rights talks by legal and political elites and institu-
tions. Not only have the meetings set priorities for action, but they have also contributed to shap-
ing the regional discourses on human rights, and to consolidating common positions within the 
larger Asian context. 37 Offi cial human rights meetings at the regional and sub-regional levels are 
representative of the local, regional and the globally circulating human rights culture.
Even without producing tangible results, the various meetings dedicated to human rights 
in ASEAN demonstrate that the resistant approach toward human rights that characterized the 
1990s has shifted toward forms of acceptance concerning the concept of rights. Katsumata argues 
that:
In the global community of modern states today, its core members, the advanced industrial-
ized democracies, are championing a set of liberal reforms, thereby creating a social en-
vironment which defi nes human rights as an element of legitimacy in this community….In 
such circumstances the ASEAN members have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norms of hu-
man rights which is championed by the advanced and industrialized democracies motivated 
by their desire to be identifi ed as advanced and legitimate. 38
While “mimetic acceptance” does not indicate a substantial change in approach toward the con-
cept of human rights, it shows that human rights discourses cannot be totally avoided; they have 
been progressively entrenched in the culture of the region and have thusly formed an important 
part of a wider global rights culture. The formal commitment to participate in the international 
community – already expressed in the 1997 “ASEAN-Vision 2020” and the “Hanoi Plan of Ac-
tion”39 – translates into an obligation to heed human rights.
Indeed, Asian countries are responding to what they once considered Western hegemonic 
discourses by using their same language; that is, they are using human rights discourses to frame 
their arguments and articulate their claims both regionally and internationally. In adopting the 
language of rights, Asian countries formally commit themselves to “the dominant mode of moral 
engagement in an interconnected, uncertain and rapidly changing world.” 40
However, this commitment does not mean that human rights are talked about in Asia be-
cause of an ideological adherence or legal commitment to the concept; but because Asia is an 
actor in the global arena, it must participate in a global culture where human rights play a signifi -
cant role. Indeed, the “step by step, constructive and consultative approach” which informs the 
commitment to human rights in all the major ASEAN human rights documents, and the related 
lack of urgency for the creation of stable institutions and legal mechanisms for the promotion 
and protection of human rights, “raises the suspicion that the UN annual workshops are means 
for states to avoid establishing any such permanent arrangements under the pretext of appearing 
committed to the ideal.” 41
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Offi cial elites approach human rights as ideals, the objects of expectations, which they may 
then discuss. Dato Param Coomaraswamy aptly expressed this perspective in the Welcome Re-
marks to the 8th Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, when he ex-
plained that “our [ASEAN’s] chosen approach has always been engagement and so we welcome 
this opportunity to again meet with all of you and talk, openly and frankly, about what we can 
expect and what we should strive for, given the situation at hand.” 42 In a similar fashion, after 
the creation of the ASEAN inter-governmental commission on human rights, the ASEAN heads 
of state applauded the new organ not by steadily supporting its action, but by mildly expressing 
“confi dence that ASEAN cooperation on human rights will continue to evolve and develop.” 43
The fact that human rights are discussed at the regional level with little visible effort to 
translate talks into practice indicates the diffi culties inherent in the process of regional, or even 
sub-regional consensus building upon concepts like human rights and social justice. The creation 
of a transnational consensus means that a compromise must be reached – across differences in 
ideology, political and cultural practices – that in such “a diverse cultural context,” as expressed 
in the ASEAN Charter, is quite diffi cult to achieve.
While human rights are accepted as a matter of principle, no concrete attempt to make them 
regionally specifi c has been made yet. The creation of regional courts and commissions, for ex-
ample, would represent a fundamental step in making human rights claims possible since, with-
out courts, the meaning, content and scope of human rights remain utterly vague. Talks about 
rights are fundamental, though void and meaningless if not concretized in legal practice. As it 
has been demonstrated in other regional contexts, the existence of regional standards and courts 
would represent promising avenues to improve national legal systems and raise the quality and 
sophistication of domestic human rights litigation.
For example, after Brazil’s ratification of the American Convention of Human Rights in 
1992, the regional human rights system became a powerful tool in the hand of Brazilian activist 
lawyers who started to engage in rather aggressive domestic human rights litigation. 44 Eastern 
European countries have followed a similar path after their accession to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. 45
Admittedly, the creation of a regional legal regime would indicate a genuine step forward in 
the human rights cause in Asia, but it would bring signifi cant challenges to the national interests 
and the political status quo in various states. Challenges would come both from within and from 
outside the domestic borders of the various states.
First, the creation of regional legal instruments would defy the principle of non-interference 
at its very core. Individual states would have to be externally accountable, at least regionally, for 
the abuses against their citizens, and would have to put in place domestic mechanisms for the 
enforcement of human rights principles. Regional courts would decide upon cases involving in-
dividual states and their citizens, and states would be compelled to enforce the decisions taken by 
judges often speaking a foreign language. Specifi cally, at the regional level, this would also lead 
to the creation of legal mechanisms and institutions incorporating Asian approaches to human 
rights, and, at the national level, it would request the implementation of new legal instruments or 
the reform of existing laws – all changes associated with signifi cant economic costs and human 
resources involvement.
Secondly, the attempt toward “regionalization” of international principles would lead to a 
signifi cant self-refl ection upon regionally specifi c cultural perspectives and practices that must be 
then “legalized” in human rights documents. In order to put in place a human rights legal regime 
refl ective of the cultural context from which it has emerged, Asian leaders would need to clearly 
defi ne the meaning of Asian culture and its relation with rights.
Indeed, based on the assumptions that “law is the result of local knowledge, not placeless 
principles,” and that the “law is constructive of social life and not refl ective, or…not just refl ec-
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tive,” 46 it is believed that the adoption of a human rights law would inevitably prompt a more sus-
tained refl ection of local needs in relation to wider global and regional contexts. The creation of 
a human rights regime will not only be refl ective of social life discourses, but it would also create 
new expectations and possibilities for different social actors located at the regional or domestic 
level.
To limit human rights discourses to political statements rather than legal commitments rep-
resents, fi rst, an attempt to discourage a “bottom up” approach towards human rights – an ap-
proach based upon the active involvement of civil society – and secondly, an attempt to limit the 
emergence of a culture of rights which may oppose the political status quo. The language of legal 
rights is a powerful and threatening one, which, once entrenched in culture, may become part of 
local communities’ approaches to reality and can, rephrasing Twining, “stimulate and enlarge 
moral imagination.” 47 Political struggles in the name of rights are becoming increasingly com-
mon even in most conservative political regimes, like China, for example, 48 and demonstrate the 
power of the language of rights, a power which may inevitably create anxieties among regional 
elites. Indeed, with respect to practices, the pursuit of human rights requires people to become 
involved in specifi c political and legal processes, perhaps not ideal when trying to promote peace 
and security in the region.
4. Conclusion
This article is a very modest attempt to delve into the complex relationship between rights 
and culture in a specifi c regional context, and to show the latent tensions inherent between the 
two concepts. The cases of Asia and ASEAN in particular represent an interesting laboratory for 
this specifi c study.
The article demonstrates that both the “Asian values” debate and contemporary approaches 
toward human rights are both born from very specifi c historical circumstances. The “Asian val-
ues” debate represented the exemplifi cation of a romantic understanding of culture, intended as a 
static, homogeneous, coherent and consensual entity. In view of their recent colonial past, Asian 
countries, in an apparently contradictory move, deliberately adopted a markedly Western ap-
proach to culture to resist the neo-colonial imposition of liberal values.
The contemporary approach toward human rights represents a more complex and sophisti-
cated reaction to Western concepts, and as such is much more diffi cult to decipher. Asian elites 
do not talk anymore about an anachronistic dichotomy between rights and culture, but they do 
accept to be a part of a global human rights culture that pretends to accept plurality and diversity. 
Again, they speak the language that Western countries may easily understand. However, simply 
by committing to the ideal of rights and playing a waiting game in their practice, they do not of-
fer any substantive and regionally specifi c contributions to the circulating culture of rights; rather, 
they simply act as spectators. While a circulating human rights culture alone may be able to trig-
ger regional solidarity and solidify values promotable at the regional level, it may hardly promote 
integration as such. Only the creation of legal institutions codifying regional human rights behav-
ior might lay the foundation for integrating and facilitating integration agreements. Integration 
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